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Abstract
　　During　the丘1ming　of　James　Clave11’s　Shogun　i11　Japan　film　teams　from
both　Japan　and　the　United　States　experienced．　continual　friction　during
the　course　of　their　daily　communication　as　they　sought　to　complete　the
enormou§1y・complex　task　of丘lming　simultaneously　a　twelve－hour　television
series　and　a　feature－1ength　motion　picture．　This　article　analyzes　the
conflicts　the　groups　encountered　from　the　perspectives　of　communication
theory　and　values　orientation　theory．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Introduction
　From　June　4　to　December　9，1979　for　a　period　of　130　days　a　team　of
American　filmmakers　under’the　leadership　of　Jerry　London　and　Eric
Bercovici　was　in　constant　daily　contact　with　a　team　of　Japanese　film－
makers　from　the　Toho．　and　Daiei　companies　together　with　numerous
　＊An　earlier　version　of　this　paper　was　presented　at　the　13th　Internationa正
Convention　of　the　Communication　Association　of　the　Paci丘c　in　Seou1，　Korea
July　29－August　3，1983．
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independents　in　the　filming　of　the　epic　Shogun．　In　the　words　of　the
director，　Jerry　London：
　　　　Shogun　was　probably　the　greatest　piece　of且lm　ever　made　in・Holly－
　　　　wood，　AIld　that　includes　Gone　With　the　Wind　and　everything　else
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1）
　　　　because　it　was　twelve　hours　long．
　　For　nearly　eight　Inonths　the　experienced丘lm　crews　from　these　two
nations，　most　of　whom　could　not　speak　the　other’s　language，　were　forced
to　use　speech　and　other　forms　of　communication　among　themselves　to
accomplish　something　which　had　never　been　done　before，　The　results，
of　course，　were　admirable．　Shogun　as　both　a　television　mini－series　and
afeature五lm　was　a　commercia1，　popular　and　artistic　success．　For　prac－
tically　all　of　the　participants，　Japanese　and　American　alike，　it　marked　the
highest　point　in　their　careers　to　date．　For　many　it　will　likely　remain　the
high－water　mark　of　their　professional　experience．　　　　　　　　　　　　・
　　S加g媚has　been　praised　by　mally　quarters　in　the　United　States　for　if、
not　giving　greater　insight　into　the　minds　of　the　Japanese　at　least　creating
a　greater　interest　in　things　Japanese　and　the　beginning　of　a　broader
appreciation　of　Japanese　culture　and　history　as　well　as　for　Japanese
technical　and　economic　ac．hievements．
　　The　Japanese　for　their　part　have　often　wondered　what　the　fuss　was
all　about．　Watching　Shogun　for　its　entertainment　value　is　more　di缶cult
for　most　Japanese　because　so　many　of　the　details　of　the丘1m　conflict
with　what　they　believe　to　be　true　of　the　history　of　the　period　in　which
the　story　is　set　and　because　many　of　the　film　conventions　demanded　by
American　television　and　film　audiences　clash　with　their　expectations　or　do
not　communicate　well　to　the　Japanese．　The　Japanese　did，　indeed，　watch
the五rst　few　episodes　of　the　television　version　in　large　numbers，　but
more　perhaps　in　curiosity　so　as　to　see　what　it　was　that　had　stirred　up　the
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Americans　so．　The　general　reaction　of　both　personal　acquaintances　and
the　mass　media　in　Japan　at　the　time　was　mysti丘cation　at　the　intensity
of　the　reported　American　response　to　what，　in　most　Japanese　eyes，　was
adistorted　‘‘ガ伽ゴ．gelei　”（historical　costume　drama）．　Nevertheless，　if
Shogun　has　not　had　the　impact　upon　Japanese　audiences　that　it　had　upon
American　丘1m　audiences，　most　Japanese　have　appreciated　the　effort　to
make　a丘1m　about　things　Japanese．　And　if　it　has　indeed　stirred　up　a
wider　and　keener　interest　in　Japan　on　the　part　of　the　American　and
European　public，　they　are　content．
　　And　yet，　while　production　crew，　executives　and　actors　are　all　unstinting
in　their　pride　in　their　accomplishment　and　praise．of　the　results，　there
has　also　been　widespread　comment　by　many　of　these　same　participants
on　the　persistence　of　communication　di伍culties　encountered　during　the
filming　in　Japan　and，　ill　particular，　as　to　the　problems　the　two　national－
ities　had　in　working　together．　In　some　cases　expression　of　these　dif五culties
has　been’extreme　or　even　sensationalized　for　its　publicity　va豆ues．　In　others
it　has　been　more　objective　and　carefully　prefaced　with　qualifying　caveats
emphasizing　the　positive　achievements　of　the且lm　and　its　contribution　to
lntercultural　understanding．　The　following　citations　are　representative。
　　　　First，　to　observations　by　journalist，　Dr．　Neil　Martin，
　　　　　　　　…Communication　was　a　constant　problem．　Japanese　being　an
　　　　　　　　imprecise，　and　indirect　language　proved　to　be　a　poor　channel
　　　　　　　　through　which　to　communicate　the　short，　speci五c　and　direct
　　　　　　　commands　of　the　English　speaking　crew．　And　although　the
　　　　　　　　production　at　its　peak，　had　more　tha且adozen　interpreters　on
　　　　　　　　hand，　English　instructions　were　never　passed　along　fast　enough
　　　　　　　　to　suit　the　U．　S，　production　staff．　This，　plus　the　Japanese　pen－
　　　　　　　chant　for　wanting　to　hold　group　meetings　and　conferences　every
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time　an　unexpected　order　was　relayed　or　there　was　a　change　in
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（2）
schedule，　made　filming　sequences　extremely　di缶cult．
The　peculiarity　of　Japanese　group　relationships　also　proved
nettlesome　for　the　American　staff．　On　the　Shogun　set　in　Kyoto，
some　of　the　Japanese　crew　were　from　Toho　studios　of　Tokyo，
some　were　from　Daiei　of　Kyoto　and　a　few　were　independents．
Frequently，　an　order　would　be　given　to　an‘‘independent”who
would　pass　it　on　to　one　or　another　or　both　of　the　other　groups
and　despite　the　fact　that　the　independent　had　a　higher　position
on　the　crew　roster，　the　other　group　considered　action　only　after
aconferellce　with　other　group　members。　Such　squabbles　between
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the　U．　S．　and　Japanese　production　staffs　built　up　in　intensity．
Next，　from　the　director’s　diary，
The　frustrations　of　making　this　film　have　come
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（4）
the　cultural　differences．
ba ically　from
And三丘nally　two　comments　by　Japanese　members　of　the　production　staff，
We　pointed　out　to　them（the　director　and　the　screenplay　writer）
numerous　places　where　the　script　was　strange（from　the　Japanese
po董nt　of　view）but　the　response　was　always‘‘That’s　all　right．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（5）
Don，t　worry　about　it．，，
There　was　a　lot　of　friction　and　that　sort　of　left　a　bad　taste　in
our　mouths　after　the　filming　was　complete．　We　understood　that
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　　　　　　　the　film　was層not　a　joint　verttiure　but　thought　that　we　Were
　　　　　　　supposed　to　point　out　when’things　were　mistaken．’Then　one
　　　　　　　day　in　Kyoto　we　were　told　by　the　Production　Executive，‘‘This
　　　　　　　is　a　Paralh6unt　picture，　and　we　want　things　done　our　way．”At
　　　　　　　that　point　We　understood　and　resolved　to　do　only　as　we　were
　　　　　　　told．　It　w’ould　have　been　better　if　we　had　understood　this　from
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（6）
　　　　　　　the　beginning．
　　The　general　tenor　of　these　comments　is　that　there　was　a　perception
by　members　of　both　the　Japanese　and　American　production　staffs　and
external　observers　that　communication　problems　were　a　source　of　friction
and　even　conflict　during　the且lming　in　Japan，　Because　of　the　extent
and　the　intensity　with　which　the　two　groups，were　in　contact，　it　may　be
instructive　to　examine　the　lnaking』of　Shogun　more　closely　to　determine
to　what　extent　conflict　or　friction　actually　existed，　to　what　extent　such
conflicts　or　friction　as　did　exist　could　be　attributed　to　co皿municative
behavior，　the　nature　of　the　communicative　behavior　engaged　in　by　the　two
crews，　what　generalizations　can　be　made　about　communicative　interaction
between　the　Japanese　and　American　production　crews　during　the創ming
and　what　generalizations　might　be　made　as　to　the　probable　nature　of
colnmunication　interaction　between　Japanese　and　Americans　in　other
encounters　between　members　of　the　two　cultures．
Data　Sources　and　Objectives
　　For　resource　material　in　this　study　I　will　be　relying　upon　several
sources：excerpts　from　the　daily　diary　of　the　director，　Jerry　London，
which　apPeared　in　the　September，1980　issue　of　’American℃inematographer，
other　articles　and　interviews　w．ith　the　director　of　photography，　Andy
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Lazlo，　the　producer，　Eric　Bercovici，　and　the　author，　James　Clave11，　in　the
　　　　　　　　（7）
same　source，　comments　and　descriptions　from　the　book　The　Maleing・げ
加、、Clav、〃、　SH・G6盤aseries・f・rti・1・・b，　D・．　N・il　M…i・・pP・a・i・窪
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（9）
in　November，1980　issues　of　7「he！1∫α乃ゴ動6κ勿g　News，　and　three　exten－
sive　personal　interviews　with　the　director，　one　of　the　Japanese　unit
production　managers，　and　one　of　the　Japanese　assistant　directors　for
casting．　I　will　be　using　this　material　to　extract　th6　p6rceptions　of　the
staff　members　of　the　communication　interactions　among　the　crews　and
then　allalyzing　these　perceptions　from　several　different　theoretical　view－
POlnts．
　　First，　I　will　be　looking　at　the　exteht　to　which　the　participants　perceived
communication　proble血s　as　arising　from　language　di缶culties，　personality
．conflicts，　cultural　di丘erences，　incompetent　personne1，　technical　problems，
and　di鉦erences　in丘lm・making　teChniques．　Next，　I　will　be　looking　at　the
receiver　variables　operating　to　facilitate　6r　reduce　effective　communication．
Thirdly，　I　shall　be　looking　at　the　cultural　values　which．seemed　to　be
operating　to　in且uence　the　perceptions　of　the　communicative　acts　of　the
participants．　And且nally，　I　shall　be　looking　at　the　e廷orts　made　by　both
sides　to　resolve　conflicts　once　they　perceived　that　conflict　or　friction　had
arlsen．
　　0！1e　last　caveat　I　should　like　to　make　before　beginning　the　analysis　i6
to　stress　that　readers　of　this　paper　should　not　construe　any　comments
made　here　as　attempts　to丘x　blame　for　problems　or　criticize　either　the
且1m　itself　or　any　of　the　people　involved　in　makillg　it．　Nor　should　should
readers　feel　that　I　am　criticizing　the　values　of　one　or　another　culture　or
advocating　that　participants　in　intercultural　encounters　such　as　the　very
intense　one　which　occurrbd　during　the　eight　months　of　filming　Shogun
give　up　the　values　of　their　native　culture　and　adopt　those　of　their　host
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culture　for　the　duration　of　their　stay　in　that　culture．　What　is　being
attempted　here　is　to且rst　determine　what　was　actually　happening　from
an　objective　point　of　view，　identifying　where　possible　what　factors　served
to　aggravate　or　mitigate　friction　between　members　of　the　different　cu1・
tures，　and丘nally　to　suggest　steps　which　might　be　taken　in　subsequent
encounters　to　mitigate　friction　and　enhance　the　bene丘ts　to　be　achieved
from　such　encounters．
Perceived　Sources　of　Conflict
　　During　the　interviews　I　asked　each　interviewee　to　determine　on　a　five－
point　scale　the　frequency　with　which　he　attributed　friction　between　the
two　film　teams　to　one　of　six　general　areas．　The　results　are　Iisted　in
table　1．
Table　1．　Pereeived　Sources　of　Friction
Problem
Source
American
Director
Production
Manager
Assistant
Director
ー?????language　dit且culties
personality　conflicts
cultural　differences
incompetent　personnel
technical　problems
different　procedures
sometimes
sonユetimes
sometimes
sometimes
usually
frequently
sometlmes
sometlmes
usually
sometlmes
frequently
sometlmes
sometlmes
sometlmes
usually
sometlmes
frequently
sometimes
　　As　can　be　seen，　the　perceptions　of　these　three　representative　decision
makers　on　both　the　Japanese　and　American　sides　is　in　fairly　good　agree・
ment．　It　is　interesting　to　note　that　in　contrast　to　the　statements　made
by　Dr．　Martin，1anguage　differences　were　not　conceived　of　as　posing　a
ma］or　problem　for　the　production．　All　three　interviewees　stated　repeatedly
that　the　large　staff　of　competent　interpreters　was　a　major　asset．　Problems
mentioned　in　relation　to　language　diMculties　were　as　follows．　Jerry
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工ondon　found　that　relaying　orders　through　the　female　interpreters　seemed
to　be　taking　too　long．　He　decided，　therefore，　to　give　his　instructions
directly　to　all　production　members，　Japanese　or　American，　and　if　the
Japanese　members　could　not　understand　then　they　would　go　to　the
interpreters　to　ask　for　clarification．　The　situation　subsequently　improved
to　his　satisfaction．　London　attributed　the　initial　slowness　to　respond
to　the　fact　that　most　of　the　interpreters　were　females　from　outside
organizations　and　that　the　male　Japanese　staff　resented　taking　orders
from　or　through　them．
　　The　perception　of　casting　director，　Tatsuhiko　Kuroiwa，　on　this　point
differed　from　London’s．　He　felt　that　there　was　no　aversion　to　taking
instructions　through　the　interpreters　because　they　were　female．　He　said，
rather，　that　during　the　early　stages　of　the　filming　the　interpreters　who
who　were　language，　not創m　industry，　specialists　were　not　yet　acquainted
with　the　special　jargon　of　the　industry　or，　perhaps　more　importantly，
with　the　concepts　lying　behind　the　terminology　being　used．　He　indicated
that　discussion　of　interpreted　orders　in　the　early　weeks　of　the　shooting
schedule　was　motivated　by　a　desire　to　insure　that　the　instruction　had
been　understood　properly．　According　to　Kuroiwa’s　perception，　London　got
better　results　when　he　switched　his　procedure　for　three　reasons．　First，
the　interpreters　were　becoming　more　acc耳stomed　to　the　special　jargon
being　employed，　second　the　Japanese　were　becoming　adjusted　to　London’s
style，　and　finally，　many　of　the　necessary　technical　terms　used　by　the
Japanese　were　derived　from　English　anyway　and，　in　fact，　the　Japanese
crew　could　respond　directly　to　such　instructions　once　they　were　accustomed
to　hearing　them　pronounced　by　an　American．
　　It　is，　perhaps，　necessary　to　comment　on　several　other　aspects　of　the
language　differences　problem．　London　felt　that　some　of　the　dif五culties
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reported　in　Dr．　Martin’s　series　of　articles　had　been　sensationalized　for
their　story　appeal．　It　was　true　that　in　some　cases　the　necessity　of
interpreting　instructions　aggravated　dif且cult　technical　problems，　but　it
was　not　London’s　impression　that　this　was　due　to　the　nature　of　the
dif丘erence　between　the　Japanese　and　English　languages．　He　felt　that
such　problems　would　arise　in　any　large－scale，　bilingual　effort．　Nor　did
the　Japanese　feel　any　different．　As　to　the　assertion　that　Japanese　ls　an
“imprecise　and　indirect　language，”it　may　be　true　that　in　many　sltuatlons
the　Japanese　find　it　desirable　to　use　their　language　in　such　a　血anner．
However，　the　Ianguage　itself　is　not　imprecise　and　indirect．　Moreover，
且lming　Shogun　was　not　one　of　those　occasions　where　the　Japanese　value
such　behavior．　Indeed，　one　of　the　personal　reasons　I　was　motivated　to
make　this　study　was　that　I　had　previously　worked　with　the　members
of　the　Japanese　stafE　involved　in　the五1ming　and　had　noted　that　their
use　of　commallds　and　giving　of　instructions　was　as　precise　as　that　of
American・film　crews（an　area　in　which　I　also　have　direct　experience　as
aformer　TV－film　director　for　the　U．　S．　Army）．　My　personal　observations
り1n　th量s　respect　were　confirmed　by　all　three　interviewees．
　　AII　three　interviewees　felt　that　personality　clashes　did　sometimes　occur．
They　did　not，　however，　feel　that　they　had　any　important　in魚ence　on
the　communicative　patterns　of　the　production　as　a　whole．　All　three
lnterviewees　concurred　in　attributing　the　occasional　flaring　of　tempers　to
the　intense　technical　pressures　of　making　the丘1m，　the　extremely　uncoln・
fortable　physical　environment　in　some　locations，　and，　toward　the　end　of
the　shooting，　the　eagerness　of　some　of　the　American　staff　to丘nish　the
』ob　and　get　back　to　their　homes　and　families．　All　three　felt　such　problems
as　did　occur　were，　therefore，　a　normal　by－product　of　being　Placed　in
difHcult　surroundillgs　and　did　not　feel　that　it　had　a’subsequent　impact
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on　communication　among　the　two　staffs．
　　It　is　interesting　to　note　that　both　the　Japanese　respondents　felt　that
cultural　differences　contributed　more　to　friction　and　con且ict　than　did　the
American　respondent．　It　also　interesting　to　note　that　at　one　point　in
his　diary，　Jerry　London　makes　the　statement　quoted　previously　that，．
‘‘ she　frustrations　of　this　film　have　come　basically　from　the　cultura1
　　　　　　　（10）
differences．”When　bsked　directly　to　clear　up　this　apparent　inconsistency，
London　replied　that　he　felt　the　diary　note　was　a　product　the　situation
on　that　particular　day，　and　that　looking　back　over　the　whole　experience
he　felt　that　the　friction　that　occurred　was　more　likely　to　be　attributable
to　the　nature　of　the　job　being　done　than　to　cultural　differences．
　　All　three　respondents　felt　that　while　there　were　some　examples　of
incompetent　personne1，　they　did　not　signi丘cantly　af〔ect　the　production　by
causing　friction　or　con且ict　between　the丘lm　crews．　Rather，　all　three
interviewees　felt　that　the　major　cause　of　friction　and　conflict　during　the
filming　were　the　technical　problems　inherent　in　making　a丘lm　of　Shogun’s
scope　under　the　conditions　imposed　upon　them　by　time，　money　and　the
envlronment．　・
　　Somewhat　related　to　the　previous　area，　London，　in　particular，　felt　that
different　Japanese　practices　in　filmmaking　were　a　problem．　Foremost，
among　these　were　casting　and　cast　handling　practices　and　certain　technical
practices．　For　example，　the　Japanese　practice　of　allowing　actors　to　do
other　work　during　a　production　created　problems　both　in　signing　actors
and　in　rearranging　the　shooting　schedule　when　weather　or　or　technical
problems　forced　a　change．　Technical　problems　ranged　from　electrical
power　requirements　to　the　lack　of　certain　types　of　cameras　and　supporting
equipment．　The　Japanese　felt　that　this　was　less　of　a　problem　for　them
since　they　were　willing　to　learn　from　the　Americans　anyway．　However，
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the　casting　director　did　concur　that　the　conflict　between　the　Japanese
system　of　scheduling　around　the　needs　of　the　actors　and　the　American
system　of　scheduling　around　the　technical　requirements　of　the　filming
was　a　major　and　continuing　source　of　friction．
Communication　Variables
　　Based　on　the　sources　mentioned　above　I　would　now　like　to　discuss
the　communication　variables　which　I　believe　were　operating　in　the　com・
municatio！1　interaction　between　the　American　and　Japanese皿embers　of　the
production　staff．　First，　I　would　like　to　Iook　at　the　area　of　source　variables．
These　are　de旦ned　as　the　judgements　which　the　receiver　in　a　communi・
cation　transactioll　makes　about　the　source，s　communication　acts．　The
three　major　categories　of　source　variables　are　credibility，　homophily－
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heterophily　and　power．
Credibility
　　As　Burgoon　has　pointed　out，　the　credibility　variable　is　the　best　indica－
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tor　of　effectiveness　in　communication．　This　was　a　particularly　important
variable　in　the五lming　of　Shogun．　Credibi董ity　refers，　in　genera1，　to　the
trustworthiness　of　the　source　as　perceived　by　the　receiver．　This　is　a
concept　that　extends　back　to　Aristotle’s　ethos，　but皿odern　communicatlon
「esearchers　have　operationalized　the　concept　to　include五ve　dimensions
and　three　stages．　The　dimensions　are：competence，　character，　composure，
soclability　and　extroversion．　The　three　stages　are　initial　credibility，
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t「ansactional　credibility　and　terminal　credibility．
一83一
Competence　and　Character
　　For　Americans　competence，　or　the　source’s　knowledge　of　his　subject　or
field，　is　the　most　important　factor　in　assigning　credibility．　For　the　Japa－
nese　competence　is　important　but　means　nothing　if　the　source　of　com－
munication　is　not　perceived　to　be　of　high　character．　Character　is　de且ned
as　the　apparent　trustworthiness　of　the　source。　In　Japan　the　character
factor　is　assigned　greater　weight　than　competence　in　granting　credibility．
Moreover，　the　character　factor　is　perceived　in　terms　not　shared　by
Americans　in　general．　To　grant　a　communicator　a　high　character　rating，．
the　Japanese　must　perceive　that　source　to　be　demonstrating　concern
for　the　interpersonal　needs　of　the　group（whether　it　is　a　temporary　group
or　not）　and　placing　his　concern　for　the　goals　of　the　group　ahead　of　his・
task　or　private　goals。　The　Japanese　operationalization　of　this　concept　is
also　modified　by　Japanese　concepts　of　what　constitutes　a　group．　These
concepts　will　be　disctlssed　Iater　in　this　paper　in　the　section　on　values．．
The　fact　that　Japanese　give　a　relat1vely　greater　weight　to　character　than
competence　ill　granting　credibility　to　a　source　and　thus　accepting　the
source’s　communication，　does　not　mean　that　the　Japanese　are　not　concerned
with　private　goals　or　accomplishing　tasks．　The　Japanese，　in　genera1，　are．
very　task　oriented，　but　their　priorities　in　assigning　credibility　are　different
from　those　of　Americans．
　　The　Americans　working　on　the　Shogun　project，　for　the　most　part，　con・・
sidered　the　Japanese　to　be　hardworking，　and　determined　but　also　inflexi－
ble，　cliquish　and　technologically　inferior　vis　a　vis　the　film　industry．　The
Japanese　perceived　the　Americans　to　be　technologically　sophisticated　and
competent　but　lacking　in　su茄cient　concern　for　human　relations，　arrogant，
unpredictable，　brash，　hardworking，　friendly　and　insensitive　to　the　nuances
of　interpersonal　relations．（Again　let　me　emphasize　that　these　are　a
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catalog　of　perceptions；not　an　objective　assessment　of　the　character　of
the　peoPle　working　on　this　project．）
Initial　Credibility
　　Differing　perceptions　of　三nitial　credibility，　the　degree　of　credibility
perceived　in　the　source　prior　to　any　communication，　contributed　to　later
frictions　because　of　an　early　but　major　misunderstanding　that　resulted
because　the　malority　of　the　Japanese　production　staff　believed　that　they
would　be　involved　in　a　co－equal　production　effort　on　the　artistic　side．
The　executive　members　of　the　Japanese　staff　knew　that　the　majority　of
the五nancial　capital　was　coming　from　the　American　side　and　that　the
丘lm’s　main　market　was　to　be　in　the　United　States．　However，　they　as－
sumed　that　the　reason　the　film　was　being　made　in　Japan　was　to　glve　lt
artistic　authenticity，　and　they　also　knew　that　their　work　would　be　broad－
cast　in　Japan．　They　did　not　conceive　from　the　signals　given　ollt　by
the　American　side　that　Japan　was　to　be　merely　the　background　for
the　story　or　that　the　Japanese　staff　were　being　hired　simply　for　their
technical　skills．　As　reported　in　one　of　the　quotations　above，　the　Japanese
middle－management　levei　sta丘did　not　clearly　understand　until　the　shoot・
ing　was　almost　half　over　that　the　movie　was　not　to　be　a　co－production．
Their　misperception　was　due　in　part　to　the　failure　of　higher　management
to　comlnunicate　this　to　lower　leveIs，　in　part　to　middle　management　over－
9eneralizing　from　previous　experience　in　making　movies　with　American
companies（many　of　the　Japanese　crew　had　been　involved　in　the丘lming
of　Tora／Tora！Tora！），　and　in　part　because　the　American　executlves
and丘lm　crew　did　not　perceive　early　enough　that　the　Japanese　crew　was
acting　under　this　misconception．　This　misconception　affected　the　whole
quality　of　Communication　during　the　early　months　Qf　shooting　as　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　－85一
Japanese　repeatedly　found　the　adtions　of　the　American　team　to　be　at
variance　with　their　expectations　of　what　partners　in　a　co－equal　production
should　be　doing　and　with　what　they　had　come　to　expect　of　American
teams　from　previous　experience．
　　The　American　side，　for　its　part，　had　been　assuming　that　the，　to　them，
Clear　signals　of　all　the　artistic　top　positions　b6ing且lled　by　Americans
and　the　executive　and　financial　power　being　in　their　hands　was　su伍cient
to　communicate　the　true　nature　of　the　relationship（i．　e」that　the　produc－
tion　was　an　American　movie　being　filmed　on　location　in　Japan　with　local
nationals　being　hired　to　do　some　tasks）．　Moreover，　the　American　side
did　welcome　and　encourage　artistic　input　from　the　Japanese，　but　placed
lower　priority　on　that　input　than　meeting　the丘lm’s　budgetary　and　time
objectives．　In　addition，　the　American　manner　of　directly　asking　for　such
input　was　usually　perceived　by　the　Japanese　as　a　courtesy　rather　than
as　a　sincere　request　for　input　（that　is　that　unless　the　request　is　repeated
Several　times　with　other　customary　cues，　it　is　in　the　nature　of　phatic
rather　than　instrumental　colnmunication）．　In　other　cases，　what　the
Americans　conceived　of　as　clear　signals　regarding　the　relationship　between
the　Japanese　and　American　staffs　were　not　simply　misinterpreted，　they
were　not　even　perceived．　The　important　point　of　all　this　is　that　even
before　filming　began　the　Japanese　felt　that　their　advice　in　an　area　in
which　they　felt　that　they　were　the　experts　was　being　unfairly　ignored．
This　served　to　decrease　the　esteem　of　the　American　team　in　their　eyes
and　therefore　reduced　their　willingness　to　accept　communication　from
the　Americans．　Thus，　the　initial　credibility　of　the　Americans　as　granted
by　the　Japanese　was　lowered　because　the　Americans　were　perceived　as
being　less　competent　than　expected　in　art三st圭c　affairs（historical　authen－
ticity　and　7’idai　geki　conventions）and　in　character　because　of　the　manner
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in　which　they　failed　to　repeat　requests　for　artistic　input　and　dismissed
suggestions　that　conflicted　with　time　and　budget℃riteria．
　　On　the　other　hand，　the　Americans　being　experts　in　one　of　America’s
most　technologically　intensive　industries　tended　to　view　competence　in
atechnical　sense．　That　is，　they　soon　perceived　that　the　Japanese丘1m
crews　lacked　the　sophisticated　machines　the　Americans　were　accustomed
to　working　with　（certain　types　of　cameras，　cranes　and　dollies），　and
therefore　assumed　that　the　Japanese　crews　were　inferior　in　other　skills
as　well．　Having　thus　not　granted　credibility　in　one　area　they　found　it
dif五cult　to　grant　credibility　in　others．　None　of　this　was，　of　course，
illtentional　or　malicious．　Such　misunderstandings　occur　daily　between
melnbers　of　the　same　culture．　However，　once　credibility　is　lost　or　reduced，
it　is　extremely　diMcult　to　recapture　and　thus　diminishes　the　effectiveness
of　subsequent　communication．　Favorable　modification　of　transactionaI
credibility　is　a　very　diMcult　task　and　is　often　innuenced　by　the　remalnlng
three　dimensions　of　credibility．
Transactional　Credibility
　　Recall　that　the　remaining　three　dimensions　of　credibility　are　composure，
or　Poise　under　conditions　of　stress，　sociability，　or　the　amount　of　time
that　communicators　spend　associating　with　each　other，　and　extrover・
slon，　the　eagerness　with　which　the　source　engages　ln　communlcatlon．
Differing　Japanese　and　American　perceptions　of　these　dimensions　and　their
valuations　both　contributed　to　friction　in　some　ways　and　failed　to　mitigate
friction　in　others．
Composure
　　Composure，　for　example，　is　highly　valued　by　the　Japanese．　Americans
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value　it，　too，　but　consider　that　overt　expression　of　emotion　under　stress
is　healthy　and　a　sign　of　a　stable　personality．　The　Japanese　perceive　the
overt　expression　of　emotion，　especially　ullder　stress，　as　childish　and
unmanly．　In　particular，　the　American　production　executive　who　was
sent　over　as　a　replacement　when　the且lm　began　to　exceed　its　budget
was　perceived　by　the　Japanese　to　be　de丘cient　in　composure　because　of
his　frequent　verbal　tirades．　In　addition，　one　of　the　most　serious　incidents
of　the丘lming　occurred　when　the　associate　producer　and丘lm　writer，　Eric
Bercovici，　lost　his　temper合t　the　refusal　of　the　Japanese　crew　to　work
overtlme　on　one　occasion　and　vented　his　frustrations　verbally，　The　Japa－
nese　crew　refused　to　return　to　work　until　he　apologized．　Likewise，　the
outward　composure　of　the　Japanese　was　often　perceived　by　the　American
staff　as　reticence，　sulkiness，　ignorance　or　non・cooperation．　Composure，
which　is　a　dimension　that　often　serves　to　mitigate　frictions　by　increasing
transactional　credibility，　in　the　case　of　communication　among　the　American
and　Japanese　crews　working　on　Shogun，　did　not　mitigate　and　often
aggravated　friction　because　of　the　very　important　ways　in　which　their
cultures　de且ne　and　value　cornposure　differently．
Sociability
O…fth・m・st　imp・rt・・t　w・y・i・　whi・h　th・J・p・n・・e　and　American・
manage　the　negotiation　of　changes　in　transactional　credibility　is　by
means　of　socialization．　Put　silnply，　the　more　chances　that　people　have
to　be　together，　the　more　opportunities　there　are　for　their　perceptions　of
credibility　to　be　modified．　This　is　particularly　important　in　the　Japanes6
culture　where　character　receives　greater　weight　than　competence　in
grantlng　source　credibility．　Socialization　is　even　institutionalized　under
the　term　of　tsuleiai　or　association　with　one’s　work　force’colleagues　after
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working　hours．　On　the　other　hand，　for　Americans　socialization　is　primarily
with　llon－work　force　friends　and　conducted　dyadically　for　the　most　part．
American　socializing　is　conducted　voluntarily　for　advocational　reasons
and　normally　in　non－public　places　such　as　homes　or（while　on　the　road）
hotel　rooms．　VocatiQnally　oriented　socializing　is　highly　ritualized　as　in
o伍ce　parties　and　business　lullches．　The　American　crews　followed　their
familiar　patterns　and　generaliy　returned　straight　to　their　hotels　when　a
day’s　shooting　was　completed．　Most　engaged　in　private　activities　and
nornlaily　those　few　who　wanted　to　socialize　did　so　among　themselves　in
their　hotel　rooms．　The　few　occasions　when　some　the　American　stafε
did　join　their　Japanese　colleages‘‘to　go　out　drinking”were　primarily
dyadic．　That　is，　the　American　invited　a　Japanese　he　liked　personally　tQ
go　out　for　a　drink．
　　Japanese　tsuleiai　is　a　different　concept　of　socialization　though　superficially
similar　to　going　out　for　a　drink．　First　of　a11，　it　is　done　as　a　group　not
as　palrs　or　as　a　small　group　of　peopie　with　similar　advocational　interests．
Secondly，　although　small　bars　are　the　most　frequent　locale　of　tsuleiai，
drinking　is　not　the　goal　and　in　fact皿any　of　the　group’s　members　do　not
even　drink　anything　stronger　than　coca－cola．　The　primary　purpose　of
tsukiai　is　to　give　members　of　a　work　group　the　opportunity　to　intensify
their　feeling　of　group　membership　by　getting　to　know　more　about　each
other　without　the　task　pressures　inherent　in　the　work　situation．　Whether
9「oups　are　temporary　or　permanent，　socialization　through　tsuleiai　is　co11－
sidered　vital　for　effective　communication　in　Japan．　Thus　anyone　who
fails　to　take　frequent　opPortunities　to　associate　with　members　of　the　work
9「ouP　outside　of　working　hours　finds　his　credibility　lowered．　On　the　other
h・・d，m・・y　m・mbers・f　th・w・，k　g，。。p　wh。　m。yb。weaki。、。mp。．
tence　credibility　may丘nd　their　character　credibility　ampli且ed　by　sincere
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partlclpation　ln　tsuleiai．
　　Conversely，　the　Americans　often　perceived　the　group　socializing　of　the
Japanese　as　cliquishness　or　as　an　unwarranted　attempt　to　intrude　upon
what　little　private　time　was　available　to　them　during　their　sojourn　in
Japan．　There　were　some　Americans　who　socialized　very　well　with　the
Japanese，　especially　among　the　artistic　crews，　but　in　general　both　sides
failed　to　make　effective　use　of　socialization　to　increase　credibility　and
mitigate　friction　because　of　differing　perceptions　of　the　value　of　this
dimension　in　assigning　credibility　and　because　the　pressures　of　the　task
itself　left　relatively　little　time　available　for　the　crews　to　socialize　outside
of　the　work　site　anyway．
Extroversion
　　Finally，　in　this　section　we　turn　to　the　dimension　of　extroversion．　Even
in　the　American　culture　optimal　source　extroversion　is　perceived　of　as
being　expressed　in　moderation．　However，　a　certain　amount　of　extrover－
sion　is　desired　for　initiating　communication　and　for　llegotiating　changes
ln　transactional　credibility．　To　Americans　the　reticent　comlnunicator　is
de丘cient　in　credibility　even　when　he　or　she　does　choose　to　communicate．
The　Japanese　also　seem　to　value　moderate　extroversion　but　may　be　more
conservative　than　Americans　in　this　regard．　More　importantly，　the
Japanese　seem　to　place　a　strongly　negative　value　on　excessive　extrover．
sion　and　genera11y　associate　verbosity　with　excessive　extroversion．　Most
of　the　members　of　the　American創m　team　were　very　verbal　and　their
expansive　friendliness　and　intense，　verbal　expression　of　their　ideas，　analy－
sis　of　problems　and　defense　of　their　points　of　views　and　ways　of　doing
things　may　have　had　a　negative　effect　on　many　of　their　Japanese
colleagues．　Conversely，　the　relative　reticence　of　most　members　of　the
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Japanese　staff　was　perceived　by　the　Americans　as　shyness，　slyness，
ignorance　or　embarrassment　when　often　the∫apanese　were　simply　listening
politely　and　waiting　for　a　sincere　invitation　to　participate．　（By　sincere
Iam　referring　to　the　Japanese　perceptions　not　American　intentions．
Repeating　a　request　several　times　and　patiently　waiting　for　disclaimers
such　as“My　opinion　really　isn’t　worthy”to　be　expressed　are　interPreted
as　a　sincere　request　for　participation）．
Homophily・Heterophily
　　The　next　major，　source　variabie　of　communication　is　called　the
homophily－heterophily　continuum。　Homophily　refers　to　the　perceived
degree　to　which　the　source　is　similar　to　the　receiver　in　outlook，　values
and　other　attributes。　Heterophily　refers　to　the　perceived　degree　in　which
the　source　and　the　receiver　differ　in　these　attributes．　Reduced　to　fairly
silnple　terms，　a　certain　degree　of　similarity　between　the　source　and
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Lreceiver　is　necessary　for　communication　to　take　place　and　the　greater
the　degree　of　similarity　the　more　effective　comMunication・will　be．
However，　when　similarit量es　proceed　beyond　a　certain　leve1，　there　is　nQ
need　to　communicate　as　both　source　and．　receiver　have　essentially　the
same　amount　of　information．　Thus，　a　certain　amount　of　heterophily　or
difference　is　necessary　to　motivate　or　energize　a　communicative　exchange
alld　to　make　it　interesting．　On　the　other　hand，　if　the　source　is　too．
dif〔erent　from　the　receiver，　understanding　is　reduced　or　even　becomes
lmpossible．　Thus，　the　best　conditions　for　ef〔ective　communication　exist
when　these　forces　are　in　dynamic　equilibrium　where　there　is　enough
slmllarity　to　make　communication　possible　and　enough　difference　to　make
lt　desirable．　This　point　is　called　opitmal　heterophily．
　　Turning　to　this　homophily－heterophily　continuum　we　find　that　both　sides
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failed　to　identify　more　than　a　few　surface　similarities　such　as　the　desire
to　make　a　good　film　within　time　and　budgetary　limitations．　On　the　other
hand，　both　sides　readily　identified　differences　and　e！nphasized　them．　Thus，
optimum　heterophily　was　not　achieved．　The　normal　strategies　for
reducing　heterophily　to　a　manageable　level　are　frequent　interaction，
empathy　（or　projecting　oneself　into　another’s　place）and　paying　close
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attention　to　feedback．　In　the　case　of　the　communication　among　the
members　of　the　Shogun丘lm　teams　these　strategies　often　proved　ineffec・
tive　or　were　inoperative．　For　example，　although　there　was　frequent　inter－
action　it　was　all　task　related　in　communication．　Differing　Japanese　and
American　perceptions　and　the　interpersonal　interactions　of　both　con－
tributed　to　fr1ction　in　some　ways　and　failed　to　mitigate　friction　in　others．
Source　Power　Variables
　　As　Burgoon　points　out，‘‘when　a　receiver　perceives　that　a　source
possesses　some　sort　of　power，　speci丘c　patterns　of　communicative　behavior
call　be　predicted．　In　any　communication　interaction，　a　receiver　has　certain
unique　physical，　psychological　and　social　needs．　The　source’s　potential
for　satisfying　the　needs　of　the　receiver　provides　the　motive　bases　for
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power　to　operate　in　a　communication　situation．”There　are　a　number　of
such　motive　bases．　They　are　reward　power，　referent　power，　coercive
power，　expert　power，　and　legitimate　power．　Reward　power　is　de丘ned　as
the　ability　of　the　source　to　provide　positive　sanctions　such　as　concrete
．or　intangible　rewards　if　the　receiver　complies　with　the　source’s　requests．
Examples　might　be　salaries　or　new　technological　know－how．　Coercive
power　refers　to　the　ability　of　the　source　to　administer　negative　sanctions
such　as　punishment　or　withholding　rewards，　Examples　would　be五ring
an　employee　or　withholding　new　knowledge．　Referent　power　refers　to
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power　granted　to　the　source　on　the　basis　of　human　emotions　such　as
loyalty，　or　liking，　or　respect．　An　example　would　be　the　referent　power
that　a　feudal　lord　uses　when　he　asks　one　of　his　warriors　to　commit
ritual　suicide．　Expert　power　exists　when　the　receiver　perceives　the　source
as　having　superior　knowledge　or　expertise　on　a　particular　subject．
Finally，1egitimate　power　stems　from　the　internalized　values　and　beliefs
of　the　receiver　that　grant　that　the　source　has　the　‘‘right”　to　influence
her　or　him。　An　example　of　legitimate　power　would　be　the　sense　of
values　we　have　that　allows　a　teacher　to　assign　a　grade　to　a　student
based　on　that　teacher’s　evaluation　of　a　student’s　performance．
　　In　addition　to　these　five　classes　of　power，　there　are　three　conditions
that　exist　to　maximize　the　effectiveness　of　power．　These　are　also
perceptions　that　the　receiver　holds　with　regard　to　the　source　in　a　com・
munication　transaction．　They　are　perceived　contro1，　perceived　concern
and　perceived　scrutiny．　Even　if　the　receiver　grants　that　the　source　has
one　or　all　of　the　above　classes　of　power，　the　receiver　will　not　be
in且uenced　to　receive　the　communication　in　a　certain　manner　unless　she
or　he　perceives　that　the　source　can　actually　control　the　receiver’s　behav－
ior　by　carrying　out　positive　or　negative　sanctions．　For　example，　if　the
source　threatens　to　use　coercive　power，　but　the　receiver　perceives　that
he　is　bigger　and　stronger　than　the　source，　the　receiver　is　unlikely　to
respond　to　a　request　to　perform　a　certain　action．　Similarly，　the　receiver
may　grant　that　the　source　has　power　and　control　but　doesn’t　care　to
exercise　that　power　or　controL　Th量s　is　a　perceived　lack　of　concern．
Finally，　the　receiver　may　perceive　that　a　source　has　power，　control　and
concern　but　canllot　observe　the　behavior　of　the　receiver　as　when　a
teacher　is　not　present　in　a　junior　high　school　classroom．　This　would　be
acase　of　perceived　lack　of　scrutiny，　and　the　receiver　may　behave　contrary
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to　the　request　of　the　source．
　　In　regard　to　power　variables　some　friction　arose　among　the　American
and　Japanese　members　of　the　Shogun　film　team　because　Japallese　groups
retain　legitimate　power　within　the　group　rather　than　delegating　it　to
executives．　Japanese　directors　and　other　executives　tend　to　be　the
spokespeople　for　their　groups　in　public　situations　and　peacemakers　and
coordinators　within．　Japanese　producers　are　minor丘gures　in　the　film
industry．　This　clashed　strongly　with　the　autocratic　styles　of　directors
and　producers　in　the　American　film　industry．　It　also　led　to　misperception
oll　the　part　of　the　Japanese　of　the　communicative　styles　of　both　the
American　director　and　the　producer．　In　general，　the　Japanese　did　not
grant　power　to　the　American　executives　to　the　extent　to　which　Americans
are　accustomed．　On　the　other　hand，　the　Americans　granted　expert　power
to　the　Japa！1ese　in　only　limited　areas　when　the　Japanese　expected　to　be
granted　more．
Confiict　Resolution
　　Now，　let　me　turn　to　the　area　of　con且ict　resolution．　Both　sides　soon
realized　that　they　were　having　diMculties　in　communication　beyond　what
they　had　anticipated。　Since　all　the　parties　were　sincerely　engaged　in
trying　to　make　the　best　film　they　could　within　the　parameters　grallted，
．both　sides　sought　to　define　and　then　resolve　the　conflicts　as　they　saw
them．　We　have　already　touched　on　a　number　of　areas　in　which　percep－
tions　were　unconsciously　different，　and　we　shali　touch　on　more　in　the
next　section　on　value　differences．　Here，　however，　I　should　like　to　deal
with　not　the　nature　of　the　conflicts　themselves，　but　the　manner　in　which
attempts　were　made　to　resolve　them．　In　American　culture　when　two
Parties　to　a　conflict　seek　to　resolve　that　conflict，　an　important且rst　step
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is　to　restore　credibility　by　meeting　directly，．face－to－face，　and　attempting
to　determine　the　causes　of　the　con丘ict　by　analysis．　Credibility　is
increased　by　a　process　of　mutual　self－revelation　and　negotiation．
　　In　Japan，　on　the　other　hand，　looking　for　causes　is　interpreted　as　trying
to　duck　the　central　issue　of　credibility　and　interpersonal　trust　by　trying
to　avoid　being　blamed　for　the　con且ict　or　its　initiation．　Moreover，　self－
revelation　is　perceived　as　a　childish　effort　to　get　one　party　obligated　to
the　other．　Finally，　when　credibility　has　been　lost，　the　role　of　a　mediator
is　essentia1．　The　two　sides　have　already　lost　faith　in　each　other．　How
can　they　talk　honestly　to　each　other　P　Americans　see　the　resolution　of
conflict　as　a　task．　Japanese　see　the　resolution　of　conflict　as　the　reestab－
1ishment　of　interpersonal　trust．
Thus，　in　the　conflicts　which　arose　the　norrna1　strategy　of　the　Americans
was　to　get　together　with　the　Japanese　party　to　the　confiict　and　explain
what　was　really　happening　as　the　Americans　saw　it．　The　Japanese　side
ln　such　a　situation　was　likely　to　bring・along　someone　to　serve　as　an
mtemledlary；someone　they　perceived　as　having　the　trust　of　both　sides．
The　Japanese　would　perceive　the　American　strategy　as　childish，　and　the
Americans　would　perceive　the　Japanese　as　unnecessarily　comPliOating
matters　by　bringing　in　someone　who　had　no　business　there　or　else　as
the　Japanese　trying　to　gang　up　on　the　Americans．　Thus，　the　culturally
preferred　strategies　for　resolving　conflicts　in　many　cases　served　to　aggra－
vate　rather　than　mitigate　or　resolve　the　conflict．
Japa皿ese・American　Value　Orientations
　　As　should　be　apparent　by　now，　communication　conflicts　in　the　filming
of　Shogun　can　primarily　be　traced　to　incidents　of　what　are　termed
ascribed　communication．　That　is，　receivers　in　one　culture　group　assigned
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鵬rceptions　to　c㎝muni（rative　behavior　t｝蹴were　not　iロtended　by　the
source　of　that　communicative　act．　This　important　concept　can　l）e　placed
in　perspective　by　referring　to　figure　1．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Source　has　an　　　　　　　　Source　does　not
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　intent　to　　　　　　　　　　　　have　an　intent　to
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COmmu皿Cate　　　　　　COmmunlCate
Receiver　perceives
an　lntent　to．
COmmUnlCate
Receiver　dQes　not
percelve　an　lntent
to　comm皿1cate
　　　　　A．
Communication
　　　　　C．
CommunicatiQn
　　　Attempt
　　　　　B．
　　　Ascribed
Communication
　　D．
Behavior
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Fig。　l　Comm皿ication　and　intent・
　　Such　misperceptions　are　com．mon　among　com．municators　in　any　culture，
but　in　an　intercultural　encounter　such　as　that　which　occurred　during　the
創ming　of　Shogun　there　is　likely　to　be　a　much　higher　frequency　of
ascribed　communication　or　non・perceived　communication　attempts．
0…fth・imp・・亡・nt・ea・…f・r　this　c…i・t・nt　p・ttern・f　mi・perceptign
was　the　different　values　held　in　regard　to　certain　fundamental　areas　of
human　interaction．　Many　of　these　val，ues　can　be　drawn　from　the
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Kruckhohn　values　orientation　model　as　modi丘ed　by　John　Condon．　A　va正ue
orientation　is　a　solution　held　in　common　by　members　of　a　particular
culture　to　certain　ulliversal　problems　and　conditions　common　to　all　human
beings．　It　is　assumed　that　since　a11　human　beings　exist　in　relation　to
nature．，　the　self　and　societies　and　the　interfaces　betw㏄n　them，　L　e．　human
behavior（society・and　nature），　the　family　（self　and　society）and　the
supernatura1（self　and　nature），　that　all　human　cultures　will　have　evolved
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value　orientations　regarding　these　areas．
figure　2．
　　　　　　The　supernatural
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　nature
　　　　　　　　　human　nature
These　are　di grammed　in
the　self
the　family
society
　　　　　　　　　　　　Fig．2　Kluckhohn・Condon　Values　Orientation　Model
　　Human　cuitures　use　these　value　orientations　as　guidelines　to　decide
what　is　right　or　wrong　or　good　or　bad．　The　value　orientations　constitute
the　ideal　criteria　for　behavior　in　the　culture．
　　Furthermore，　it　is　assumed　partly　on　research　and　partly　due　to　theo－
retical　force　that　㏄rtain　clusters　of　value　orientations　are　likely　to
occur，　but　that　others　are　not．　Those　likely　to　occur　are　listed　in
table　2．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Table　2．　Value　Orientations
SELF
Indi▽idUaliSm－interdependen¢e
1．individualism　　　　　　2．　individuality　　　　　　3．　interdependence
Age
1．youth　　　　　　　　　　2．　the　middle　years　　　　3．　old　age
Sex
1．equality　　　　　　　　2．　female　superiority　　　3．　male　superiority
Activity
1．doing　　　　　　　　　　2．　being－in－becoming　　　3．　being
THE　FAMILY
Relational　orientations
　1．　individualistic　　　　　　　　2．　collateral　　　　　　　　　　　　3．　lineal
　Authority
1．democratic　　　　　　　2．　authority・centered　　　3．　authoritarian
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Positional　role　behavior　　　　　　．
1．　open　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2．　general
Mobility
1．high　mobility　　　　　2．　phasic　mob重．1ity
SOCIETY
Sociaheciproeity
1．independence’@　　　　2．　symmetrlca1－
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　obligatory
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　l　　　　　t　　　　　 　　　　　陰
Group　membership　　　　　　’
1．many　groups，　brief　　2．　balance　of　nos．1
　　identification，　　　　　　　　　　and　3　　　’
　　subordination　of
　　group　to　individual
Intermed量aries
1．no　intermediaries　　　2．　specialist
　　　（directness）　　　　　　　　intermediaries　only’
Formality
1．informality　　　　　　　2．　selective　formality
Property
1．　private　　　　　　　　　　　　　2．　utilitarian
HUMAN　NATURE
Rationa．1ity
1．　rationa1　　　　　　　　　　　　　2．　intuitive
Good　alld　evil
1．good　　　　　　　　　　2．　mixture　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　good　and　evil
Happiness，　Pleasure
1．happiness　as　goal　’　　　2，　inextricable　bond　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　happiness　and　sρdness
Mutability　　　　　　　　　　　　　・
1．change，　growth，　　　　2．　some　change
　　learning
NATURE
Relationship　of　man　and　nature
1．man　dominating　　　　2．　man　jn　harmony
　　nature　　　　　　　　　　　　with　nature
Ways　of　knowing　nature
1．　abstract　　　　　　　　　　　　　2．　circle　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　induction－deduction
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3．　speci丘c
3．low　mobility，　stasis
2，cQmplementary・
　　obligatory
3．few　groups，　prolong・
　　ed　identification，
　　subordination　of　the
　　member　to　the　group
3．　essential
　　 ntermediaries
3．pervasive　formality
3．comlnunlty
3．　irrational
3．evil
3．lif 　is　mostly
　　sadness
3．　unchanging
3．n ture　dominating
　　man
3．　specific
Structure　of　natute
1．mechanistic　　　　　　　2．　spiritual
Concept　of　time
1．　future　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2．　present
THE　SUPERNATURAL
Relationship　of　man　and　the　supernatural
1．man　as　god　　　　　　2．　pantheism
Meaning　of　life
1．　physical，　material　　　　　2．　intellectual　goals
　　　goalS
Providence
1．　good　in　life　is　　　　　　　2．　balance　of　good　and
　　　unlimited　　　　　　　　　mi色fortune
Knowledge　of　the　cosmic　order
1．　order　is　　　　　　　　　　　　　2．　faith　and　reason
　　　comprehensible
3．　organic
3．past
3．man　controlled　by
　　the　supernatural
3．　spiritual　goals
3． Qod　in　life　is
　　limited
3．mysterious　and
　　unknowable
　　Ishall　only　be　discussing　a　few　of　the　value　differences　which　I　feel
were　most　relevant　to　communication　confiict　between　the　American　and
Japanese　crews．
Activity
　　Because　the　JapaneSe・American丘lm　tealh　wa§essentially　a　task　group
the　activity　value　orientation　of　the　two　societies　influenced　theit　com・
municative　behavior．　The　American　culture　is　described　as　a　doing
culture　and　this　was　the　orientation　of　the　leadership　ill　the　making　of
Shogun．　Jerry　London　repeatediy　stated　in　his　diary　and　in　in　his　inter・
view　with　me　the　necessity　for　adhering　to　the　shooting　schedule；of
never　losing　a　day’s　shooting．　It　didn’t　matter　so　much　what　was　being
shot　on　any　particular　day　as　long　as　they　were　doing　sohlething　that
moved　them　concretely　closer　to　the　goa1．　　　』　層
　　On　the　surface，　the　Japanese　often　apPear　to　Americans　to　have　a
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similar　orientation，　but　at　a　deeper　level　we五nd　that　the　orientation　of
the　Japanese　is　a　being　in－becoming　orientation．　This　is　the　orientat責）n
illustrated　in　the　modern　fable　of／bnathan　Livingston　Seagull．　The
activity　that　one　is　engaged　in　is　not　valued　in　itself　or　eVen　for　the
task　it　accomplishes．　It　is　valued　for　the　deeper　insight　it　gives　one
into　one’s　self　or　the　closer　it　moves　one　to　superordinate　goals　of　the
group　or　society．　The　Japanese　members　of　the　crew　with　whom　I
spoke　were　proud　of　what　they　accomp王ished　with　Shogun，　but　were
uniform　in　remarking，“I　wish　we　could　have　done　a　better　job　of
explaining　Japanese　culture　to　the　Americans。”　“Ithink　the且Iln　could
have　been　better　artistically．”Again，　the　American　members　of　the　crew
might　well　argue　with　such　remarks，　but　what　is　important　here　is　the
different　values　they　illustrate．
Social　Reciprocity
　　Another　important　value　difference　was　along　the　conti卿um　of　social
reciprocity．　Americans　hold　the　idea　that　social　relationships　are　voluntary，
contractual　and　equidirectional．　This　is　said　to　be　a　value　of　independence
in　social　relatiolls，　The　Japanese　value　is　toward　complementary－obligatory
social　ties，　Social　ties　are　obligatory　and　not　voluntary．　Moreover，　they
differ　in　kind　between　parties．　A　good　illustration　for　American　readers
of　a　complementary・obligatory　relationship　is　the　parent・child　relation．
Achild　does　not　voluntarily　enter　into　the　relationship　of　being　a　child
to　his　parents．　Nor　can　the　child　repay　his　parents　in　kind　for　being
born．　Normally，　the　child　repays　the　love，　affection　and　protection　his
parents　give　him　by　showing　them　the　love　of　a　child　and　growing　up
and　acting　as　a　parent　in　the　same　manner　with　his　or　her　own　children．
The　relationship　is　not　contractual．　That　Americans　often　wish　it　were
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is　illustrated　by　the　complaint　of　many　rebe11重ous　youngSters　when　they
cry　out，‘‘Ididガt　ask　to　be　born，　you　know．”
　　Like　the　naturally　derived　obligations　of　parent『‘and　children　to　each
other，　the　Japanese　believe　that　leaders　and　fonowers　and　all　members　of
all　groups　have　such　complementary　and　yet　obligatory　relationships
among　themselves．　This　view　of　the　world　is　even　reinforced　by　such
terms　in　the　language　as　sθ〃ipai　and　kohai（very　roughly　senior　and
junior）which　are　almoSt　impossible　to　render　into　English　short　of　a
full－fledged　dissertation　on　the　nature　of　interpersonal　ties　in　the　Japanese
society．　The　Japanese，　therefore，　expected　certain　forms　of　behavior　from
the　Americans　tllat　were　no亡forthcoming　such　as　tolerance　for　weak　group
menlbers　or　consultation　on　major　decisions．　An　example　is　iUustrated
by　Andy　Lazlo　relating　the　story　of　his　staying　up　late　in　the　workshop
one　night　to　make　an　American　type　slate　for　recording　scenes　and　takes．
The　Japanese　were　impressed　by　his　handicraft　and　diligence　but　told
him　it　was　best　to　leave　that　type・of　task　to　someone　in　a正ess　senior
position．　The　complimentary・obligatory　orientation　is　closely　tied　to　rather
rigid　role　definitions．
Group　Membership
　　One　of　the　major　value　orientations　affecting　communication　on　the
project　was　the　attitude　of　the　respective　cultures　toward　groups．
Alnericans　tend　to　view　group　a魚1iation　as　a　temporary　or　limited
phenomena。　Task　groups　are　created　to　deal　with　certain　problems　and
discarded　when　no　longer　needed．　Such　was　the　nature　of　the　group
created　to　film　Shogun．　Japanese，　on　the　other　hand，　tend　to　perceive
membership　in　a且y　group　or　organization　as　being　Permanent　or　at　Ieast
potentially　permanent．　Most　employees，　including　the　people　frQm　Toho，
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Daiei　and．the　independents，　were　already　permanent　members　of　one
organization　and　would　in　all　likelihood　be　working　together　on　another
project　at　some　time　in　the　future．　Thus，　the　Japanese　members　of　the
group　viewed　warily　the　forming　of　interpersonal　ties　and　moved　into
evρn　task　related　activities　slowly　as　they　assessed　the　interpersonal
network．　Rivalry　among　the　groups，　however，　was　not　a　factor　as　was
asserted　by　Dr．　Martin．　Or，　at　least，　that　was　not　the　Japanese　percep・
tion．　Their　penchant　for　discussing　everything　derived　rather　from　the
need　to　accommodate　all　members　of　the　group．　From　their　point　of
view　it　was　better　to　chance　being　yelled　at　by　the　Americans　who　would
be　gone　in　a　few　months　or　let　the　task　be　delayed　a　bit　rather　than
risk　damaging　personal　relations　with　someone　they　might　be　seeing
daily　for　another　twenty　years．
Time
　　The　most　important　value　difference　affecting　communication　during
those　130　days，　seelns　to　me，　to’．be　the　American　preference　for　uSing
time　as　a　control　in　conflict　with　the　Japanese　predilection　for　using
people　as　a　control　in　task　groups．　This　is　illustrated　by　the　great　care
with　which　the　director，　Jerry　London，　planned　his　shooting　schedule　so
that　he　could且exibly　deal　with　technical　or　personnel　problems　without
Iosing　shooting　time　and　incinrring　the丘nancial　burdens　that　that　entailed．
His　approach　was　the　very　embodiment　of　the　American　belief　that　time
is　money．　One　of　London’s　first　major　problems，　however，　arose　when
Judy　Ong9，　the　actress　originally　scheduled　to　play　Mariko，　pulled　out
just　two　days　before　shooting　started．　She　had　origina11y　consented　on
the　assumption　that，　as　was　normal　in　Japan，　she　would　be　able　to　take
other　engagements　during　the　course　of　the　shooting，　When　it　was
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made　clear　that　this　was　not　possible，・then　her　manager・insisted　that
she　be　paid　for　those．engagements　she　could　not　take．　That　turned・out
to　be　too　expensive，　and　she　was　out．　Lohdon　was　able　to　coVer　for
this　inconvenience　for　sev6ral　weeks　by　rescheduling　until　Yoko　Shimada
was　signed．　　　　　　　　　．　・・’　　　・　　　　　　　　　　　‘
　　　Fr6m　the　Japanese　side，　however，「it　was　this　very　flexibility　of
scheduling　that　caused　thenl　the　greatest　headache．　In　Japan　most
actors　continue　to．do　other　work曽hile　making　films，　and　casting　directors
coordinate　the　scheduIes　of’高≠鰍盾秩@chafacters　on　an　aImost　day　by　day
b・・i・．・Th。n，　th。、h。。ti。9　sch。d。1。　i，　ar，ang，d　t。　meet　th。t，ch。d健．
When　the　schedule　is　suddenly　shifted　to　mもet　the　dictates　of　weather
or　technical　problems　all　that　coordination　has　to　be　thrown　ou七and
things　have　to　be．　planned　over　from　scratch．　The　Japanese　staff　had
reached　an　internal　compromise　with　the　Alnerican　staff　by　which　the
Japanese　casting　director　attempted　to　work　out　rescheduling．・arrange－
ments　in　anticipation　of　the　dir6ctor，s　needs．　However，　because　of　the
enQrmous　technical　dithculties’encountered　in血aking　a　fillh　on　thb　scale
of　Shogun，　rescheduling・was　frequent　and　was　the　Inost　common　source
of　con伍ct　on　both　sides；the　American　when　actors　were　not　available；
the　Japanese　when　they　had　to　tell　some　peoPle　to　go　back　to　Tokyo
and　others　to　stop　what　they　were’р盾奄獅〟@and　t y　to　get　down　to　Kyoto
or　Nagashima（in　Wakayama　Prefecture）for　location　shooting．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Co皿clusion
　　This　paper　is　far　too　short　to　give　adequate　coverage　to　the　study
of　all　the　commuhication　processes　op6rating　to　fadlitate　the　Successful
completioh　of　the　filming　of　Shogκn　or　to　aggravate　the　frictionボand
con伍cts　that　arOse　as　highly　trained　people　from　two　very　different
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cultures　struggled　together　in　close　proximity　for　nearly　half　a　year　to
surmount　great　technical　di価culties　under　often　adverse　conditions．　Yet，
what　little　has　been　talked　about　here　should　make　it　clear　that　many
problems　which　were　cursorily　attributed　to　differences　in　language，　cus－
toms　and　personality　can　better　be　understood　as　resulting　from　different
cultural　values　and　their　pervasive　impact　upon　the　communication　process
itself．　That　the　vast　majority　of　the　people　making　this創m　were　compe・
tent　and　sincere　and　channeled　their　best　efforts　into　making　the　project
the　success　that　it　became　goes　without　saying．　However，　we　can　also
feel　that　it　should　have　been　possible　to　achieve　the　same　or　better
results　with　less　friction　and　confiict　if　more　members　of　both　contingents
had　been　aware　of　the　dynamics　of　the　communication　process　itself　and
of　how　variables，　because　they　are　indeed　variables，　operate　differently
in　an　intercultural　environment．　While　it　would　be　naive　to　believe
that　we　can　eliminate　or　at　least　anticipate　those　factors　which　lead　to
such　conflicts　in　future　encounters　of　this　scale，　we　can　hope　to　learn
from　Shogun　information　that　may　help　others　to　mitigate　such　conflicts
in　the　interest　of　happier　as　well　as　successful　accomplishment　of　such
tasks．
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